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REGIONAL GROWTH AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION:
THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE

I.

Intro ducti on
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that the early stages of national growth are characterized by a deterioration
2
in the distribution of personal income. Both the later work of Professor
Kuznets
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4
h
t h es h are o f t h e upper
an d more recent stud.1 es suggest tat

deciles of the population increases significantly in the initial stages of
economic growth.

Although there is less concensus on intertemporal change

in the share of the lowest deciles,

5 recent cross section investigation

suggests that the income share of the lowest 40 percent of the population
declines quite markedly in the early stages of economic growth--up to per
capita income levels of about $300 U.S. (1971· prices).

After a period of

flattening out, the income share of the lowest 40 percent begins to rise
only after per capita income has reached relatively high levels--about
$1,000 U.S.

6

Thus there appears to be a U-shaped relationship between the

level of economic development and the income share of the lowest 40 per
cent of the population.
In the post-war period only a few developing countries have been
able to avoid this general pattern and simultaneously achieve sustained
growth of per capita national income
tribution of income.

in the size dis-

Because of the prevalence of this U-shaped relation

ship between level of development and the degree of income inequality, it
is increasingly believed that in the absence of development programs which
specifically assign a higher priority to improving the distribution of
income, distribution in most developing countries will continue to become
more unequal for a considerable time,

3

Although the regional distribution of income within countries has
been less widely studied, empirical evidence suggests that it changes over
time in a manner parallel to that of the size distribution of income.
Jeffrey Williamson's investigation of the pattern of interregional income
inequality, based both on cross section and time series data, confirmed
his hypothesis that the early stages of economic growth are characterized
by increasing interregional income disparity, while more mature stages of
economic growth are marked by regional convergence.
analysis of a sample of 24 countries

7

In particular, his

showed that low income countries

exhibited relatively small but increasing disparities in interregional income
levels.

Middle income countries had the highest degree of interregional

disparity, reflecting regional divergence in the earlier stages of economic
growth.

Middle income countries, however, were characterized by either

regional stability or convergence.

The highest income nations revealed

considerably less interregional disparity and exhibited either regional
stability or convergence.

Williamson further confirmed his hypothesis by

a time series study of interstate inequality within the United States from
1840 to 1960 which shows a
"classic pattern of regional inequality. • • during the
early stages of growth, 1840-1880, regional inequality
increased • • • ; from 1880 to 1920, the degree of inequality
stabilized and even revealed a significant decline; the 19201960 experience has been varied, to be sure, but generally
the evidence suggests a secular decline in the North-South
problem, the rate of which has accelerated from the mid-1930s
to the present. 11 8
Less complete long term data for Sweden, Italy, Brazil, and France also
give strong support to the classic pattern of regional development.

Sub

sequent intensive investigations of Canadian and Japanese regional growth

4

over long time periods which include the early stages of industrialization
have also given support to the classic inverted U-shaped pattern. 9
Clearly the observed increase in regional income inequality is closely
related to the deterioration in the size distribution of income in the early
stages of national economic growth.

Comparatively rapid economic growth in

some regions is primarily a reflection of a more rapid transfer of labor
from low to high productivity sectors, principally from agriculture to
10
industry.
Since at low income levels, product per worker in industry is
considerably higher than in agriculture~ and since a relatively small
share of the national labor force is initially employed in the industrial
11
sector,
over time such as intersectoral transfer will lead to growing
inequality in the size distribution of income.

In effect, for given wage

/

differences between sectors, initially increasing interregional income disparities which result from differentials in the regional rates of inter
sectoral labor transfer necessarily are accompanied by a lessening in the
degree of equality in the personal distribution of income.
This deterioriation in the size distribution of income in the early
stages of economic growth will be further compounded if interregional wage
differences in the same sector are correlated with the level of economic
development.

That is, just as international cross section studies suggest

that substantial intrasectoral differentials in output per worker among
countries are positively related to the level of national economic development,

12

within country studies suggest that interregional differentials in

output per worker within the same sector are correlated with the level of
regional development. 13

Thus the difference in per capita output in more

and less developed regions within countries is due to both the differing

5

sectoral allocation of labor and regional differences in per worker output
within the same sector.

As

a result, to the extent the transfer of labor

to the industrial sector is concentrated in more developed regions where
product per industrial worker is relatively high, the effect of growing inter
regional income disparities will exacerbate the trend of greater inequality
in the size distribution of income.
However, at higher levels of per capita national income, Williamson
has shown interregional income differentials are gradually reduced.

As a

result of the spread effects of modern economic growth and perhaps deliberate
government efforts to achieve a more balanced regional pattern of economic
growth, the transfer of labor from agriculture to industry in less developed
regions accelerates.

This stage of.economic development is generally associat

ed with increasing equality in the size distribution of income.

Accelerated

intersectoral labor transfer in backward areas will reduce interregional
disparities in level of development and, because a relatively small portion
of the national labor force remains employed in the agricultural sector, will
contribute to an increase in the income share of the lower deciles of the
population as well.

At the same time, the reduction in intersectoral wage

differences which accompanies increasing per capita national income will
contribute to an improvement in the size distribution of income and, to the
extent there are remaining interregional differences in the sectoral dis
tribution of the labor force, will contribute to regional convergence as
well.

6

II.

Distribution in China
In recent years much of the appeal of the Chinese model originates

in the apparently egalitarian nature of the developmental process since
1949.

The Chinese in the early-post Civil War period carried out a far

reaching program of income redistribution which raised the living standards
of the lower deciles of the population considerably compared with the pre1949 period.

The most obvious elements of this program were land reform

and the transformation of private enterprises to state ownership.

These

programs largely eliminated concentrated property ownership as a source
of continued inequality of income distribution.

Several other government

policies have also had a direct bearing on the distribution of income.
Extension of state control over the economy included central government
determination of the structure of wages and salaries within the state sector.
In industry, for example, the central government specified the structure of
wages by industry, by skill level, and by geographic area.

Through the

relatively effective control of working capital funds by the State Bank,
wages in the industrial sector were not, as in the Soviet First Five Year
Plan, subject to rapid increases as a result of interenterprise labor
competition.
In addition to controlling the structure of wages within the state
sector, the central government has used its control of the level of indus
trial wages, farm purchase prices, and retail prices of industrial goods
sold in rural areas to reduce the disparity between rural and urban incomes.

7

Available evidence suggests that real wages in the industrial sector have
not risen perceptibly since 1957.

In addition between 1950 and 1974 agri

cultural purchase prices have been raised almost 65 percent while the prices
of industrial products sold in rural areas have been increased less than 15
percent.

14

Rationing of important consumer goods, particularly foodgrains, pork,
cotton cloth, and edible oils, which was introduced in the early to mid-1950s
and has continued since, has also served to reduce interpersonal consumption
differentials.

Rationing of

commodities

whose

purchases

loom

very

large in consumer budgets, prevents higher income groups from bidding up
prices thereby reducing the ability of low income groups to purchase these
essential connnodities.

15

Because of the availability of these mechanisms

for directly influencing the distribution of income the Chinese government
like other socialist states has placed relatively little reliance on the
structure of taaes or transfer programs commonly used to alter the distri
bution of earned income in Western countries.
Western visitors to China in the past few years have invariably been
struck by the effectiveness of these policies in eliminating the extremes
of wealth and poverty characteristic of most LDCs.

Although the basic

standard of living remains low, it is widely accepted that the Chinese govern
ment has succeeded in placing a floor under the incomes of all members of
society.

16

Indeed it has been argued that a fundamental characteristic

of development policy in China has been its explicit rejection of capital
ist "trickle down" theories of growth and distribution and adoption of the
view that economic development is not likely to occur unless the living
standard of all segments of society is raised simultaneously.

17

This basic

8

philosophy motives Chinese efforts to limit income disparities between urban
and rural areas and to minimize wage differentials in the state sector of
the economy, particularly within industry.

18

Evaluation of Chinese performance with regard to income distribution
remains a largely impressionistic process.

However, because of the inter

relationship between size and regional distribution, a study of the latter
m~y provide an additional perspective from which to evaluate Chinese per
formance in achieving broader distributional goals in the post-1949 period.
This regional perspective will., however, provide only a very indirect
measure of Chinese performance with regard to the size distribution of
The central government, through its control of the regional

income.

structure of wages, insures that large differentials among regions in
value added per industrial worker are reflected primarily in transfers to
the central government treasury rather than in substantial interregional
variations in real income of workers within the industrial sector.

Despite

this partial severing of the link between regional and size distribution,
the Chinese regional experience may still be of interest for other less
developed countries where interregional variations in output per worker
are more directly reflected in interregional disparities in real personal
incomes.
This paper attempts to examine empirically several aspects of inter
regional inequality in China.

First, the degree of interregional income

inequality in China is compared to other countries where disparities among
regions are perceived as being particularly acute.

Second, the pattern

of intertemporal change in the degree of interregional inequality in China
and other countries is compared.

Finally the paper analyzes the nature of

9

Chinese regional development policy and the role of the planning and budget
ary process in alleviating interregional disparities.

This analysis includes

comparisons with institutional arrangements· for reducing disparities among
regions in Brazil, Yugoslavia, and India.

Regional Inequality in China:

A Comparative View

Because the Chinese have released virtually no information on the
geographic distribution of national income, it is difficult to compare the
degree of regional inequality with other countries.

Provincial statistical

report,, which frequently provide a wealth of other economic data, only
rarely report provincial national income. 19

Indeed, it is possible that

the Chinese did not even begin systematic compilation of provincial national
income data internally until the 1960s.

20

However, data which have been published by provincial authorities
on the gross value of industrial and agricultural output can be used as
the basis for a preliminary investigation of the degree of interprovincial
income inequality.

According to estimates based on western national income

concepts, in the mid-1950s about 70 percent of China's gross domestic product
originated in industry and agriculture.

21

Thus the sum of value added in

these two sectors is a reasonable first approximation of provincial national
income.

The first column of Table 1 shows the sum of per capita value added
in industry and agriculture by province in 1957 expressed as a proportion-of
the national average.
ity.

These data reveal substantial interregional inequal

Shanghai, the leading industrial cente~ is about five and one-half

times as developed as the national average and almost 8 times as developed
as Honan, the poorest province.

The Northeastern Provinces (Liaoning,

Kirin and Heilungkiang) and the municipalities of Peking and Tientsin are
also considerably above the national average.

Honan, Kwangsi, Kweichow,

and Shantung, with per capita incomes of about three-fourths the national
average, are the least developed regions of the country.
The pattern of interregional disparity is somewhat different if we
look at industry and agriculture separately, as shown in columns 2 and 3
of Table 1.

The most striking finding is the relatively even distribution

of agricultural output.

With the exception of the three municipalities of

Shanghai, Tientsin, and Peking, whose suburban areas had only limited cul
tivated area prior to 1958, and the sparsely populated northwestern prov
inces

of

Tsinghai and Sinkiang, whose extensive pattern of agricultural

development constrasts sharply with China proper, there is relatively little
regional dispersion.

By contrast, disparity in the industrial sector is

considerably more noticeable.

The concentration of industrial output in

the urban coastal centers of Shanghai, Peking, and Tientsin is particularly
obvious.

The strategic significance of the Northeast as a center of

industrial output is also quite marked.
The greater interprovincial disparity in the industrial sector is
reflected in the greater coefficient of variation (standard deviation
divided by the mean) of provincial per capita output in industry as compared

11

Table 1
Per Capita Provincial Income, 1957
(national average= 100)

Industry and
Agriculture

Industry

Agriculture

Northeast
Liaoning
Kirin
Heilungkian g

197
125
187

409
160

81

North
Hopeh
Shantung
Honan
Shansi
Inner Mongolia
Peking
Tientsin

94
75
72
97
116
169
391

57
63
30
96
64
482
1118

115

Kiangsu
Anhui
Chekiang
Shanghai

87
81
93
559

85
38
75
1575

88
106
103
12

Central
Hupeh
Hunan
Kiangsi

106
81
92

76
41
.56

122

103
115

95
75
79

84
34
70

102
97
85

78
76.
83

57
30
48

90
102
104

108
90.
143
133

59
37

136

44

66

190
173

.60

1.86

.26

222

~

South
Kwangtung
Kwangsi
Fukien
Southwest
· Szechuan
Kweichow
Yurman

Northwest
Shensi
Kansu
Tsinghai
Sinkiang
Coefficient
of variation

106
166

82

95
98
143
21

0

120

12
Notes to Table 1

Calculated on the basis of officially reported provincial gross
value data for industry and agriculture (appendix tables 1 and 2).
Gross value data were converted to net values by use of national
value added ratios in each sector. For agriculture the ratio used
was .80 as given in Li Ch'eng-jui, Chung-hua jen-min krmg-ho kuo
nun-yeh shui shih-kao (Draft History of the Agricultural Tax in
the People's Republic of China), Peking: Finance Publishing House,
1959, p. 193. For industry the ratio used was .34 as given by Ma
Yin-ch 'u, "Hsin jen-kou lun," (New Population Theory), Hsin hua
pan-yueh-k'an (New China Semi-monthly), no. 15, 1957, p. 40. Popula
tion data are officially reported figures for 1957 given in State
Statistical Bureau, Ten Great Years, Peking: Foreign Languages Press,
1960, p. 11.
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with agriculture.

As shown in the last line of Table 1, the population

weighted coefficient of variation (V) in industry is 1.86 while in agri
w
culture it is .26.

Thus the degree of interregional disparity in industry

is several times greater than in agriculture.
Measurement Biases
There are two potential sources of bias in our measure of the over
all degree of income inequality among provinces.

First, provincial value

'added data are estimated on the basis of national net output ratios for
industry and agriculture.

Because of wide interbranch differences within

industry in rates of value added and considerable regional variation in the
structure of industrial output this procedure may result in an underestimate
of the degree of interprovincial inequality in the industrial sector.

The

rate of value added in the producer goods sector is about three-fourths
greater than in the consumer goods sector. 22

Because the structure of

industrial output in more developed provinces, particularly in the Northeast,
is more heavily weighted in the direction of producer goods than the national
average, the use of the national value added ratio leads to an underestimation
of the value added in industry in these provinces.

Similarly, this procedure

overestimates the value added in many less developed provinces where output
is dominated by consumer goods.

Consequently the population weighted coef

ficient of variation of provincial per capita value added in industry systemati
cally underestimates the overall degree of interprovincial income inequality.
This is not a significant problem in agriculture since there is less variation
in the rates of value added in the components of the gross value of agricultural
output.

14
On the other hand, the omission of the service sector, which in
1957 composed about 30 percent of gross domestic product, may introduce
an upward bias in our measure of interregional inequality.

The distribu

tion of services was certainly more even than industry and probably more
even than the combined net value of agriculture plus industry.

However,

a significant portion of services is probably correlated with the level
of industrial output.

This would be particularly true for transporta

tion and finance and to a lesser extent for trade as well.

Thus the in

clusion of services, were data available, would probably reduce somewhat
the degree of overall interregional inequality shown in the first column
of Table 1.
However, these two biases at least are mutually offsetting in
direction--and as a result our measure of inequality among provinces may
provide at least a starting point for comparing the degree of regional
inequality in China with other countries.
International Comparisons
The size of the coefficient of variation of provincial value added
in industry and agriculture suggests that disparities in regional development
in China are quite high by international standards.

Table 2 shows the

coefficient of variation of per capita regional income for selected countries.
In the first column the dispersion of per capita regional income relative
to the national average is weighted by the region's share of national popula
tion.

Since the use of population weights minimizes the impact of the

particular division of administrative units within countries, we use it in
our discussion below.

15

TABLE 2

Interregion al Income inequality, Selected Countries, Selected Years
Coefficient of Variation
f'opulation
Years
Count!,Y
Unwei~hten
Wei~h ted
b
.65
.70
1950-1959
Brazil
Chinaa, c
India
Italy

1957

.60

1.01

b

1950/51, 1955/56

.28

.58

b

1951, 55, 60

. 36

. 37

1960

.15

na

1956, 59, 60

. 34

• 44

Soviet Union
b
Yugoslavia

Notes:
Sources:

d

a) Based on industry and agriculture only.
b) Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Regional Inequality
and the Process of National Development : A
Description of the Patterns," Economic Devel
opment and Cultural Change 11, No. 4, part 2,
(July 1965).
c) Table L
d) Hans-JUrgen Wagener~ "Les re cents modeles
de developpeme nt dans les regions economiques
sovietiques ," Revue de 1' Est 4, No. 2 (1973).
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The degree of interregional income inequality in China substantially
exceeds that found in several countries that are treated in the economic
development literature as classic cases of North~South dualism.

For example,

the disparities in China exceed both those found in Italy, with its well
known depressed Mezzogiorno.and those found in Yugoslavia where inter
republican income disparities, exacerbated by differences in nationality
and cultural heritage, have been an important element in post-war economic
planning.

India, a country that is more directly comparable with China

because of its similar level of development and continental size, has
interregional disparities which are substantially less than those observed
in China.

Only in Brazil, where the Northeast has long been a relatively

depressed area, do interregional disparities appear to be more severe than
those found in China.
III.

The Dynamics of Regional Growth
Because very little data on the value of provincial agricultural out

put have been released since the late 1950s, it is impossible to trace the
pattern of regional growth of value added in industry and agriculture combined.
Furthermore, provincial data for industry which have been released in recent
years are less complete than comparable data for the mid-1950s.

That is,

although all provinces have released data on their rate of industrial growth
in recent years, the base year for such claims is usually 1965, the year
prior to the beginning of the Third Five-Year Plan.

Only 21 provinces have

released data which compares the level of output in a recent year to a year
in which absolute value data are known.

Therefore it is not possible to

assess precisely trends in the growth of provincial national income and the
analysis presented below should be regarded as tentative.

17
There are, however, two reasons for believing that trends in
regional industrial output alone are broadly representative of overall
trends in regional national income.

First, as was shown in Table 1,

during the 1950s interregional variation in the level of industrial output far exceeded that in agriculture.

Secondly, the annual rate the average

of industrial growth for the country as a whole since 1957 hqs been about
10 percent while agricultural growth has been only marginally over 2 percent.

23

Since industry was the major initial source of interprovincial

income inequality and has been by far the most rapidly growing sector,
it is reasonable to assume that trends in regional income disparities
have been largely determined by differences in provincial industrial
growth.
Per capita industrial output by province in 1952, 1957, and 1971
expressed as a proportion of the national average is _given in Table 3.
Arrangement of the provinces in descending order of industrialization in
1952 facilitates the intertemporal analysis below.

As can be seen from

Table 3, there has been a general trend toward equalization of per capita

provincial industrial output, particularly in the upper and lower thirds
of the provinces.

Provinces where industrial output was initially well

above the national average, with the single exception of Peking, have
consistently converged toward the national average.

This tendency has

been particularly marked in the highly industrialized north-eastern
provinces of Liaoning, Heilungkiang, and Kirin.

Shanghai and Tientsin

have also grown comparatively slowly and as a result have tended to
converge toward the national average.

Only Peking, among the initially

JB

Table 3
Relative Differentials in Per Capita Output,
Industry, 1952, 1957, and 1971
(national average = 100)
Shanghai
Tientsin
Peking
Liaoning
Heilungkiang
Kirin
Kiangsu
Chekiang
Kwangtung
Shansi
Shantung
Hopei
Sinkiang
Kiangsi
Fukien
Hupeh
Yunnan

Szechuan
Inner Mongolia
Shensi
Hunan
Tsinghai
Anhui
Kwangsi
Kweichow
Kansu
Honan

1952

1957

1971

1813
1187
458
393
272
162
107
80
80
77
72
58
58
58
53
58
43
42
42
40
38
38
35

1575
1118
482
409
222
160
85
75
84
96
63
57
66
56
70
76
48
57
64
59
41
44
38
34
30
37
30

1363
392
732
310

33

30
20
18

155
105
82
66
50
49
45
71
31
43
150
a~

✓ :J

51
62
40

28
46

Note: Calculated on the basis of officially reported provin
cial gross value data for industry (Appendix Table 1) and on
population data reported in or derived from official sources.
For 1957 officially reported population data were used. For
1952 and 1971 estimates are based on extrapolation forward from
1957 and backward from the officially reported 1953 provincial
population data. Extrapolations are based on the individual
provincial growth rates during 1953-57, with the exception of
Kwangtung where I have used the adjusted growth rate suggested
by John S. Aird [Population Estimates for the Provinces of the
People's Republic of China: 1953 to .1974, Internation~l Popu
lation Reports, Series_ P-95; ·no. 73 (Washington, D. C: Depart
ment of Commerce, 1974), pp. 12-i3]. Adjustments were made .for
boundary changes of municipal governments in 19.58 and 1959. I
have assumed no growth in popu1.ation of Peking, Shanghai, -and
Tientsin since the time of these boundary changes.
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more industrialized areas, has enjoyed a consistently alx>ve average rate
of industrial growth.
On the other hand, the performance of the initially poorest prc,,.r
inces

has been generally above average.

Very rapid rates of growth

since 1952 are particularly apparent in Honan, Kansu, Tsinghai,
Hunan, Shensi, and Inner Mongolia.

The middle range of provinces, from

Shansi to Szechuan, however, has shown mixed performance with marginal
declines relative to the national average for most of the group.
The long term trend of slow but perceptible convergence is confirmed
in Table 4.

The population weighted coefficient of variation of per capita

industrial output for 21 provinces declines from 1.99 in 1952 to 1.84 in
1957 and 1.63 in 1971.
It should be emphasized that because of the nature of the underlying
data, that the summary findings presented in Table 4 can be regarded as only
a tentative indicator of the direction of change of overall provincial in
come inequality during the twenty year period.

There are three separate

possible sources of error--the limited geographical and sectoral coverage;

uncertainties with regard to interprovincial variation in the rates of value
added; and the 1971 provincial population data.
Most obviously the data are limited in their coverage--only indus
try is included and for the years since 1957 data are available for only
21 of 27 provinces.

The lack of data for six provinces appears to be of

only minor significance.

The comparable decline in V for both 27 and
w

21 provinces between 1952 and 1957 shown in Table 4 suggests that convergence
since 1957 for the group of 21 provinces is broadly respresentative of per-

20
TABLE 4

Secular Changes in Coefficient of Variation, Per Capita
Provincial Industrial Output, Post-1949
1952
V
w

1971

1957
V
u

V
w

V

V

V

w

u

u

27 provinces

2.02

4.07

1.86

3.61

na

na

21 provinces

1.99

4.60

1.84

4.08

1.63

3.20

fonnance for the nation as a whole. 24
perhaps more significance.

The limited sectoral coverage is of

Since the share of industry was only about 25

percent of g·ross domestic product in 1957 and because of the relatively
faster growth of industry, it is clear that the use of provincial indus
trial output

probably results in an overstatement

decline of aggregate income inequality.

of

It may also

the
give

rate

a somewhat

biased picture of the particular regional pattern of reductions.
precise impact of the missing sectors is difficult to assess.

of

Yne

The omis

sion of services probably has relatively little effect on the direction
of long tenn change in V.
w

That is, while the exclusion of services

probably results in an overstatement of the level of interregional disparity in 1957, the growth of transportation, trade, and finance, which
compose about 70 percent of services, is probably highly correlated with
industrial growth.

On

the other hand, little information is available

on the regional pattern of agricultural growth since 1957.25
Secondly, the implicit assumption of constant rates of net to
gross output within each province since 1957 probably results in an under-
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estimate of the rate of convergence.

Since the composition of output in

provinces where industry is growing more quickly appears to be changing
rapidly in favor of producer goods, which are characterized by higher
rates of value added, the gross value data which underlie the data in
Table 4 underestimate the rate of regional convergence.

26

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it should be noted that
there is a considerable degree of uncertainty attached to the provincial
population data used to calculate per capita output in 1971.

Data used

are based on an extrapolation from official 1957 provincial population
figures using the growth rates individual provinces experienced during
1953-1957.

This procedure makes no allowance for divergent provincial

trends in natural rates of population increase or changes in internal
migration patterns since 1957.

Since there has been considerable migra

tion between provinces since 1957, this procedure is far from satisfactory.
However, there is no way to estimate the influence of either migration or
divergent trends in natural growth rates.

Of course, to the extent that

migration since 1957 represents a continuation of the 1953-!957 pattern
the accuracy of the projected 1971 provincial populations is enhanced.
Since the 1953-1957 growth rates of the more remote regions, which may
have been the primary recipients of interprovincial migration in more
recent years, are already quite high, our projections may not be unreason
able.

For example, the rates for Heilungkiang (5.1%), Kansu (2.8%),

Tsinghai (4.6%) Inner Mongolia (5.1%), Shensi (3.0%), and Sinkiang (3.3%),
are substantially above the national average rate of 2.3 percent.
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In summary, it seems unlikely that the decline in Vw would be reversed
if additional information to correct these biases became available.

The
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assumption of constant rates of value added contributes to an underestimate
of the rate of convergenc~ and the population growth rates used to project
1971 populations contain an implicit built-in allowance for migration that
is probably large enough to accomodate a substantial portion of post-1957
interprovincial migration.

However, the limited sectoral coverage of our

income measure results in an overstatement of the rate of convergence.
International Comparisons
Hirschman, Myrdal, Williamson, and others have argued that in the
early stages of economic growth a variety of forces will tend to lead to
increasing regional disparities.

Because of locational advantages, his-

torical accident, resource endowment, and other considerations, certain
regions within a coW1try may have an initial advantage when the process of
modern economic growth begins.

Hirschman hypothesized that when national

growth accelerates the greater importance of "polarization effects" as
opposed to "trickle down effects" would lead to more rapid growth in more
28
Capital would
developed areas and increasing interregional disparities.
be attracted from backward areas to the more rapidly growing region of
the country and skilled labor would tend to migrate to advanced regions in
response to greater employment opportunities.

Government policies favoring

maximal aggregate economic growth rather than balanced regional develop
ment might further compoand growing regional disparities.
Only at substantially higher levels of per capita income, Hirschman
suggested, would the trickle down effects of growth become increasingly
important and neutralize the polarization effects.

Combined with increasing

costs of growth in:,advanced areas and deliberate government policy to insure
more balanced regional growth, this would lead to a decline and eventually
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a reversal of the differential rates of growth between backward and
advanced areas.

Thus the interaction of these forces gives rise to the

inverted U-shaped pattern of economic growth.
Quantitative studies of Chinese economic growth suggest that the pat
tern of regional development conforms to this classic inverted U pattern. The
record shows that although there was no sustained increase in per capita
income for the country as a whole in the first half of the twentieth
century, there was considerable growth in Manchuria and in a few coastal
cities.

As a result, the fifty years prior to the formation of the People's

Republic were undoubtedly marked by growing interregional inequality~
However, the reduction of interregional income variation in C\1ina appears
to have begun at a substantially earlier stage of economic development
than other countries for which historical time series data are available.
Regional convergence in Japan, Canada, and the United States did
not begin until after three to six decades of sustained per capita GNP
growth.

By contrast the Chinese pattern of development after 1949 is one

in which the reduction of interregional income inequality and sustained per
capita GNP growth appear to have begun simultaneously.

Furthermore, the

levels of per capita income from which convergence began in Japan, Canada,
and the United States were a several fold multiple of the Chinese level in

1949.

In short, although the Chinese appear to conform to the inverted U

shaped pattern of regional development, the timing of the convergence phase
appears to have been distinctly different from the historical experience of
the currently developed countries.
The Chinese pattern also differs from Williamson's cross section
sample of countries in the post-World War

II period shown in Table 5.
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TABLE 5
Secular Changes in Interregional Income Inequality, Postwar Period

Kuznets
Income
Class

V
w

rising

I

V

w

stable
Australia
(1949/50,
1959/60)

II

V

w

falling
Canada
(19 50-61)
United' States
(1950-61)

United Kingdom
(1949/501959/60)

Sweden (1950 ~
1955, 1961)

France (1954,
1955/6, 1958)

Finland (1950,
1954, 1958)
West Germany
(1950-55, 1960)
Netherlands
(1951, 1955,
1958)
Norway (1952,
1958-60)

III

IV

Italy (1951,

Spain (1955,

1955, 1960)

1957)
Brazil (19501959)

V

Japan
(1951-1959)
a
Yugoslavia
(1952-1971)

VI
VII

Source:

b

India
(1950-1955,
1960-1968)

Chinac
(1952-71)

Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Regional Inequality and the Process of
National Development: A Description of the Patterns," Economic
Development and Cultural Change XII, no. 4, part II (July 1965),
Table 2, for all countries except China.
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Table 5 (cont'd.)
Secular Changes in Interregional Income Inequality, Postwar Period

Notes:
a. Williamson's findings for Yugoslavia are based on data from
the mid-1950s to 1960. More recent data show that the population weighted
coefficient of variation rose continuously from 1952 through 1971. See
Vinod Dubey, Yugoslavia: Development with Decentralization (Baltimore
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 194.
b. Williamson's findings for India are based on 1950/51-1955/56.
More recent data for the period 1960/61-1967/68 confirm that V increased
w

during the 1960s as well as during the 1950s. The data for the 1960s as
are in appendix Table 3. Unfortunately. because of numerous changes in
the number of states and frequent changes in individual state boundaries
since 1956, it is not possible to directly compare our more recent results
with Williamson's findings.
c.

Tentative, based on V falling in the industrial sector only.
w
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The Chinese case contrasts in particular with India, the other low
income country in Table 5.

At independenc e India was marked by consider

able interregion al income disparity, particularl y between the former
British provinces and the independent states.

Although one of the goals

of the federation has been to reduce these initial disparities , per capita
state incomes have tended to diverge, in recent years both because of the
extremely rapid agricultura l growth in rich agricultura l states such as
Punjab, Haryana and Gujarat and because of considerabl e divergence in
29 Although some relatively developed
industrial growth rates as well.
states, such as West Bengal, have grown relatively slowly, overall dis
parities have still tended to increase slightly.
Interesting ly, the Chinese pattern also is quite different from
that of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, two countries in which the
state could presumably avoid the classic

pattern of regional growth

through direct control of the interregion al allocation of investment funds
and skilled labor.

Yugoslav economic growth over the last twenty five

years h~~ever has been characteriz ed by increasing regional disparities .
Although the Connnunist Party in the late 1940s assigned a high priority
to the rapid reduction of interregion al income disparities and each Five
Year Plan since 1947 has identified specific underdevelo ped republics
and provided special developmen tal assistance, the country has consistent
ly failed to achieve the explicit plan goal of more rapid development in
these backward regions.

Average per capita national income in less

developed regions has fallen from two-thirds that of developed regions
in 1953 to about one-half in 1970.

30
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Although long term data on the regional growth experience of the
Soviet Union are limited, a number of recent studies have shown that there
is no trend toward regional equalization, even at the relatively high per
capita income

level

attained in the post World War II period. 31

In fact,

the rate of interregional income divergence appears to have accelerated
32
since 1960.
Particularly striking has been the long term decline of per
capita output relative to the national average for several Southeastern
Republics.

Between 1950 and 1971 the relative positions of Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, and Turkmenia have fallen dramatically
--in some cases by fifty percent.

Studies· of Republican standards of living,

as reflected in personal and communal consumption, show wide interregional
differences and suggest that they increased during the decade of the 1960s. 33
Apparently the overriding commitment of the Soviet leadership to maximal ag
gregate growth has mitigated against investment allocations that would be
sufficiently redistributive to ensure more rapid growth in less developed
regions.
This result was anticipated by Williamson who hypothesized that,
"It seems highly unlikely that the Communist nations
have sacrificed rapid national growth for the "second
ary" Marxian goals of (1) introducing industrializati on
throughout the country in order to achieve the neces
sary conditions for socialism on a nationwide scale
and (2) achieving idealistic equalitarianism implied
by the socialist society. 113 '+
The mechanisms by which the Chinese after 1949 were able to simultaneously
initiate sustained per capita GNP growth and also reduce interregional in
equality are the subject of the next section of this paper.
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IV.

Central Control and Redistribution
In 1949 the Chinese communists inherited not one but three largely

independent economic systems.

By far the most advanced was the Northeast.

Modern economic growth had begun here in the 1930s, largely as a result of
large scale Japanese capital investment.

The advanced state of development,

compared to the rest of China, was reflected in both the high level of per
31
Industry
capita product and in the structure of gross domestic output.
and particularly services were far more important than in China as a whole
and within industry producer goods were

especially

important.

The major

coastal cities, particularly Shanghai and Tientsin were also very advanced.
Beneficiaries of decades of foretgn investment, they produced primarily light
industrial goods, largely for foreign markets.

Finally, there was a vast

countryside where industrializati on, with very few exceptions, had not be
gun.

Industrial output in many inland provinces was less than twenty yuan

per capita and only 6-7 percent or less of their populations lived in urban
areas.

In short, by criteria such as the scruccun: of output and employment,

modern economic growth had not yet begun.
modern growth were almost entirely lacking.

In fact, the preconditions for
Communications and transpor

tation facilities were primitive or did not exist.

China's limited rail

road development was confined largely to the Northeast;

large,

populous

provinces such as Szechuan were not linked with the rest of the country.
Large areas of the interior lacked other types of infrastructure as well,
particularly hospitals and educational institutions.
These marked regional disparities in the level of economic develop
ment had enormously important implications for the new Communist government
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that was committed to improving the size distribution of income, to reducing
regional inequality in income anrl in the provision of public goods and ser
vices, to creating a single integrated national economy, as well as to sharply
accelerating the overall pee~ ~f economic development.

Although Western

writers have usually focused on t~e latter goal in their explanation of the
profound institutional transformation carried out in post-1949 China, it
seems clear that distributional goals have also been of prime concern to
the leadership.
Clearly one of the most profound choices facing the leadership after
1949 was the degree to which industrialization should be based on further
expansion of the existing industrial centers.

These centers had considerable

aµvantages due to their extensive infrastructure facilities, large numbers
of highly skilled workers and experienced industrial managers, enormous
economies of scale, etc.

Continued concentration of investment resources

in these areas clea:rly n~~~:-ietl thia prospect of much more rapid growth of ag
gregate industrial output.
~hl<P

impl-i,..~t-inns

frnm

t-hP

On the other hand this strategy had quite unfavorpoint of view of equity.

RPr:t11RP

PYiRf"ing inter-

regional links were very weak it was quite probable that such a strategy
would have very few spillover effects and would lead to rapidly increasing
interregional disparities.

Thus the leaders faced a difficult trade-off

between growth and regional equity
The theme of the following pages is that over the past twenty-five
years the leadership has consciously chosen to sacrifice some economic growth
in return for achieving improved regional economic balance.

This choice has

been reflected primarily in an investment policy that by and large has
favored poorer regions at the expense of the advanced.

Clearly equity
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goals have not been the only consideration in determining the regional allo
cation of investment--def ense consideration, material resource endowments,
and other factors have clearly played an important role.

Furthermore, the

degree to which the Chinese have been willing to sacrifice growth in the
pursuit of equity has not remained i~variant.over time.

For example, in

1956 following :a reappraisal of 1'.'egional policy, the commitment to inland
development was marginally reduc~d-;'.eompared to the early years of the First
Five-Year Plan.

However, the pattern of regional growth and the nature of

economic planning in China suggests that regional equity has been prominent
in the collective preference ftmction of the Chinese leadership, particularly
when compared with other countries.
As was discussed earlier, in the first few years after coming to
power the central government creat2d a series of policy instruments that en
abled them to exercise far n;,ac.hir.g direct control over the distribution of
income.

These policies included land reform, elimination of the private

industrial and commercial sectors, the minimization of wage differentials
within the state sector, manipulation of the terms of trade between agriculture and industry, and rat:z.or:.i::l 5 of th;,,; most important consumption goods.
In addition to these m~chi'i%;:.sms fo·.:- directly influencing the size
distributi~n of income, the central government has also systematically re
distributed income and wealth in favor of less developed regions.

In short,

the institutional mechanisms which allowed the central government to increase
the rate of capital formation from 5 percent in the 1930s to about 25 per
cent in the 1950s and to control the sectoral allocation of these investment
resources

have also been used to carry out a significant interregional

transfer of income and wealth to less develope d regions.
The most importan t of these mechanis ms is the annual state economic
plan.

The basic means of determin ing lhe overall allocati on of resource s

within the economy, it is a fully unified developm ent program that incorpo rates
the plans of ~adc of t:ae provinc ial level governm ents as well as the progrms
run dir2ctly by th~ central governm ent ministr ies.

In the process of deter

mining the naticn21. l p18.n, the State Planning Commission simultan eously determin es
the broad outlines of the developm ent plan for each provinc e.

These provinc ial

plans set forth targets for the level of output of major industr ial and agri
cultura l products , the level and sectora l allocati on of investm ent funds,
increase in the industt ial labor force and the level of average wages in the
state sector, incr®ase s in school enrollm ents, number of hospita l beds,
volume of freight

transpo rt, value of retail sales, etc.

Within the frame

work of these centrall y determin ed paramet ers, each province draws up a more
detailed plan which includes the economic plans of local governm ents.

As a

result the naticna l plan is a fully integrat ed program that includes the
plans of all iewels of governm ent.
The nationa l budget, which is worked out simultan eously with the
state plan, provides the financin g for all of the program s included in the
economi c plan.

This includes not only funds for investm ent projects , but

also for nationa l defense , social program s, and governm ent adminis tration.
The state budget is a fully unified fiscal plan which includes the revenues
and expendi tures of provinc ial and local governm ents as well as the central
governm ent.

Thus provinc ial budgets are drawn up by the Ministry of Finance

simultan eously with the elabora tion of the nationa l budget.

These provin

cial budgets provide the financin g for all of the oroeram s included
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in provincial development plans.

Part of the provincial budget, in turn,

is allocated among subordinate municipalities and

counties to finance local

development plans.
Revenue Sharing
The simultaneous determination of the national and provincial econo
mic plans and national and provincial financial budgets provides the cen
tral government with considerable control over the geographic distribution
of resources.

Although the bulk of tax sources are nominally designated

as local revenues and are collected locally, 36 in the process of drawing up
the unified national budget each level of government is assigned and allowed
to retain only those r€venues necessary to finance the programs that are
contained in the economic plan which has been approved by its superior ad
ministrative level.

In effect, collection of revenues implies no freedom

to determine expenditures.

Excess revenues are remitted upward while

shortfalls are financed from special subsidies. Because of the large existing
interregional variations in fisca: capacity and the redistributive nature
of the centrally directed economic planning process discussed above, revenue
sharing rates at each level of government are generally highly differentiated.
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For example, relatively industrialized areas such as Shanghai, Peking, Tientsin,
and the Northeastern provinces annually remit to the central government from
50 to 90 percent of the revenues they collect.

That is, centrally approved

local development plans in these areas are so limited that they can be financed
with a relatively small nortion of locally generated resources and the excess
revenues are transferred to the central government for redistribution to other
areas.

On the other hand, less developed regions of the country have substantial

ly lower remission rates.

The least developed provinces generally retain all
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of their revenues and receive additional direct subsidies from the central
government amounting to up to 50 to 80 percent of their own local expenditure.
Redistribution is not limited to the top two layers of government,
but extends to the lowest levels of state administration.

Provincial gov

ernments typically require their major municipalities to remit dispropor
tionately high portions of their revenues allowing a reduction in the burden
38
Counti.es,. in turn,
on the less developed counties within each province.
finally redistribute resources among individual communes by establishing
higher remission rates in the richer agricultural areas within each county.
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Because the coverage and specific rates for all important taxes are
set nationally, provincial and local governments are severely limited in
their ability to mobilize resources which are not subject to this system
of revenue sharing and expenditure controi.

40

Provincial and local govern

ments can not adjust tax rates or initiate new taxes as a means of mobilizing
resources independent of central government control.

Furthermore, they are

prohibited from utilizing deficit spending to increase their expenditures
above centrally determined levels.

Only a few

Lt::vt::uut::

sources, mainly the

local agricultural surtax, are administered by local governments outside
of state budgetary channels.
access to

Similarly enterprises have very limited

funds for self-financing of investment projects.

Enterprises

are required to remit almost all of their net income, including deprecia
tion funds, to the state budget either in the form of industrial and com
mercial taxes or profit remissions.

They rely on non-returnable budgetary

grants for financing all fixed investment and for most of their working
capital as well.

Only a small portion of working capital is financed through

bank loans and these are fully integrated into the state financial plan.
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Although there have occasio nally been leakages of these loan funds for
non-plan purpose~ by and large they do not serve as an independ ent source
of finance for enterpr ises.
Investme nt and Structu ral Change
Both qualitat ive evidence for China and empiric al evidence for other
countrie s suggests that increme ntal capital output ratios in less develope d
regions are substan tially above their respecti ve nationa l averages and that
substan tially higher than average ratios of investm ent to output are re
quired to systema tically reduce per capita output differe ntials.

However,

the experien ce of Italy, Yugosla via, Brazil, and other countrie s suggests
that interreg ional income transfer s alone may not be sufficie nt to elimina te
the developm ent gap between North and South. 41

In the long rm1 structu ral

shifts in the pattern of output in backward areas are required to reduce
dispari ties in the level of developm ent.
The Chinese system of unified economic planning and financia l plan
ning has been particu larly effectiv e both in carrying out the interreg ional
income transfer and in assuring rapid structu ral transfor mation of backward
areas.

The impleme ntation of this policy since 1949 has been particu larly

evident in the industr ial and transpo rtation sectors .

Because of the pre-1949

concent ration of the investm ent resource s in Manchur ia and a few major
coastal cities, 77 percent of industr ial output originat ed in coastal areas
in 1949. 42 For politica l as well as economic reasons , the new regime began
systema tically to build up industr ial centers in inland areas.
Inland provinc es, which in 1952 (the year prior to the beginnin g of
the First Five-Ye ar plan) were the source of only 27 percent of industr ial
output, received 55 percent of total nationa l investm ent during the first
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three years of the first plan.
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However, this aggregate figure does not

reflect the concentration of these resources in a few provinces which were
selected by the center as special areas for intensive industrial develop
ment.

For example, while the ratio of investment in 1953-1955 to initial

output shares in inland provinces as a whole was about 2:1, Sinkiang, Inner
Mongolia, Shensi, Tsinghai, Kansu, and Honan during the period 1953-1957
enjoyed ratios of from 3.4:1 up to 10.5:1. 44

It is, of course, precisely

these provinces, all of which were relatively underdeveloped in 1952, which
grew most rapidly during the First Five-Year Plan period.
During this period Peking singled out 18 "key-point" (chung-tien)
cities as recipients of enormous infusions of funds for both infrastructure
investment and for industrial development.
cities were located in inland areas.

As shown in Table 6, most of these

During the First Five-Year Plan period,

these cities, which in 1953 contained less than 20 percent of China's urban
population, received almost 70 percent of all investment funds allocated
for the construction of public utilities in municipal areas, primarily
for water supply, sewer, and public transportation systems. 45

Further-

more, the two hundred complete plant projects supplied by the Soviet Union
and Eastern European cotmtries, which formed the core of the First Five
Year Plan, were heavily concentrated in key-point cities.

Of 188 plants

whose location has been identified, 110 were located in key-point cities~ 6
The breadth of these plants, including extractive industries such as oil and
coal; basic industries such as cement, iron and steel, and chemicals; fabri
cation of final goods such as locomotives, trucks, aircraft, electronic
equipment, and machine tools, suggests that the development of inland regions
was a balanced program that combined important infrastructure investment, the
development of natural resource based extractive industries, and industrial
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complexes producing a broad range of finished goods.

47

Thus unlike Italy where state support for regional development has
been largely confined to infrastructu re investment or Brazil where regional
development has focused on raw material based

extractive industries, which have

only limited local income generation and employment effects, the development
of backward areas in China has included the creation of major industrial
complexes producing a broad range of manufacture d goods for a national
market.

This deliberate development of regional linkages has been an im

portant element of post-1949 economic planning.
Investment in backward areas was financed by a long term outward
transfer of income from more developed provinces.
its starkest form in Shanghai.

This is presented in

During the period 1953-1957, for example,

Shanghai produced almost 20 percent of industrial output but was allocated only about 2.5 percent of total national investment.

This investment re

presented only about 7.25 percent of the revenues collected in the municipalit y.
This outflow of recources has continued unabated since 1957.

For the per-

iod 1949-1973 the ratio of investment to total budgetary revenue in Shanghai
was only 6.7 percent, about one-fifth to one-sixth of the national rate. 48
Although comparable data for other provinces are not available, revenue
sharing data indicates that other advanced regions have also experienced
substantial long term outward flows of revenues.

For example, Liaoning and

Kiangsu, the second and third most industrializ ed provinces in the mid 1970's,
remit about three-fourt hs of their revenues to the central government each year.
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Table 6
Location of Key-Point Cities

REGION
Northeast
Liaoning
Kirin
Heilungkiang
North
Hopei
Honan
Shansi
Inner Mongolia
Peking

Anshan, Shenyang
1

Kirin, Ch 1 angch un
Harbin,Ch'ich'ihaerh
Shihchiachuang
Chengchou, Loyang
T'aiyuan, Tat'ung
Paot'ou

(

Peking

Central
Hupeh
Hunan

Wuhan
Chuchou

Southwest
Szechuan

Chengtu

Northwest
Shensi
Kansu

Sian
Lanchou

Source:

COASTAL

INLAND

Chang Yen-hsing, "The arrangement at urban construction-work
musf be in accordance with the national policy of economy in
construction." Chi-hua ching-chi (Planned Economy), no. 12,
1957, p. 4.

38

Parallel and complementa ry to this redistributi on of financial re
sources is the systematic transfer of skilled labor and technical and
managerial manpower from more developed regions, particularl y Shanghai, to
less developed areas.
began as early as 1950.

This program, like the redistribut ion of income,
Between 1950 and 1956 the central government,

through its direct control over labor allocation, transferred over 270,000
workers out of Shanghai. Of this number 28,000 were specificall y identi49
.
This program, unlike
fied as technicians and 170,000 as skilled workers.
later rustication campaigns whose objective was to send unemployed youths
to the countryside , assigned skilled workers to specific industrial pro
jects, usually in the key-point cities in less developed regions. This
transfer of enormous human resources from Shanghai has continued since
the 1950s.

By the early 1970s Shanghai had supplied over half a million

skilled workers to inland industry.so
As a result of this wholesale transfer of investment resources and
skilled labor, less developed regions as a group have been relatively rapidly
growing and the differentia ls in per capita industrial output, shown in Table 3,
have been slowly diminishing .

Although this decline has not been uniform,

on the whole these transfers have led to a reduction in interregion al
inequality since the early 1950s.

Social Services
The system of revenue sharing and central government control of
the economic development plans of provincial governments

has also been

used to insure a more equitable regional distributio n of social services.
In effect, although the Chinese seem to have embarked on a program which

39
is gradually reducing interregional income disparities, they have moved
much more rapidly to alleviate interregional disparities in the provision
of public goods and services.

This process was facilitated by the rapid

expansion in the early 1950s in the scope of social programs financed by
the state budget.
Prior to 1953 rural primary school education as well as rural cul
tural and health programs, were not financed by the state budget but were
supported by· revenues derived from the local agricultural surtax.

51

As

a result of considerable regional variation in the level of per capita
agricultural output there were wide regional variations in the ability
of local governments to provide social services.

Because the state budget

did not yet include village (hsiang) expenditures, the center had no means
for systematically redistributing funds to improve the distribution of these
locally provided services.
Beginning in 1953 county level (hsien) government budgets were incorporated into the unified state fiscal system and most village level
.

.

c;?

revenues and expenditures were included in the county budget.~-

County

revenues were expanded to facilitate the financing of village expendi
tures.

Following this expansion of the scope of the state budget, ex

penditures for local education and other social programs were no longer
financed from revenues that were closely tied to the level of agricultural
development in each village.

Instead they were financed from the county

budget and provinces began to redistribute revenues among counties to
enable them, in turn, to redistribute revenues at the village leve1.53
The expansion of the scope of the state budget led to a rapid re
duction of regional differentials in the provision of some social services.

54
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From 1949 to 1957 considerable progress was made toward reducing extreme
inequality among provinces in the proportion of the population enrolled in
primary schools.

Nationally the proportion of the population enrolled

in primary schools more than doubled but provinces that ranked low in
1949 were able to expand their enrollments relatively more rapidly.

This

pattern continued into the 1960s and 1970s, although disparities have not
been eliminated and those provinces which performed least well in the
1950s still lag behind.

Evidence on the regional distribution of hospi~

tal beds is less complete but seems to show no similar trend of marked
reduction in interregional differentials at least in the 1950s.

Data

for more recent years have not been released.
The unified nature of planning and finance in China, which gives
the central government control of the level and sectoral allocation of
investment resources within each province and also allows the redistribution of revenues to finance

local social programs, contrasts particu-

larly with the federal systems of Yugoslavia and India.
In Yugoslavia the decentralizatio n of economic planning since the
mid-1950s has systematically undermined the ability of the central govern
ment to redistribute resources in favor of less developed areas.
the center was able to redistribute

Although

a significant volume of funds to

poor areas until the mid-1950s, the growth of these areas was comparatively
slow.

Richer republics increasingly objected to the redistributive dimen

sion of central investment plans since they believed it had resulted in
lm·1er rates of national economic growth. 55

As decentralized decision making was

introduced and the criteria of profitability increasingly determined the alloca
tion of investment funds, the investment share of less developed areas fell
dramatically--f rom about 34 percent in 1950-1955 to 24 percent in 1955-
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1959.

56

After the mid-1950s when the role of republican governments and

enterprises in determining the allocation of investment was expanded the
portion of investment funds controlled by the national government declined
. i tous 1y. 57
precip

Since 1965 the Fund for the Accelerated Development of

Underdeveloped Regions has been the major mechanism for central redistribu
tion of investment resources.

However, the financial resources available

to this fund are relatively limited and the investment share of backward
areas remains substantially below that of the 1950-1955 period.
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Although

the Social Development Plan for 1971-1975 has again set the goal of more rapid
development of backward areas, the relatively slow growth of these areas in
the first two years of the plan indicates that the goal again will not be
reached.
The sectoral allocation of investment within backward areas in
Yugoslavia has also been unfavorable to rapid growth.

Regional develop

ment in the 1950s in particular, tended to be focused on raw material
based extractive industries with little investment in infrastructure and
manufacturing.

The high capital output ratios and limited employment

generation of these projects and the lack of development of complemen
tary manufacturing facilities resulted in relatively slow growth in
spite of a centrally controlled redistributive investment policy.
Decentralization of investment planning since the mid-1950s has not
only reduced the investment shares of backward areas but has also given
republican governments greater control of the sectoral allocation of the
special development funds provided by the federal government.

However,
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this has allowed the developm ent of autarkic investm ent programs with
frequent wastefu l duplica tion of existing producti on faciliti es. 60

Thus

both because of the limited redistri bution of investm ent funds and the
unfavora ble sectora l allocati on of investme nt within backward areas, cur
rent prospect s are that regiona l disparit ies will continue to grow for
the foreseea ble future.
The prospec ts for reducing interreg ional income dispari ties in
India are equally discoura ging.

Redistri butive program s are carried

out through a complex system of tax sharing, grants- in-aid, and special
developm ents grants for financin g projects included within state economic
developm ent plans.

However , in striking contras t with Chinese coordina 

tion of central and local developm ental and financia l plans, in India
there

is

little

developm ent

coordin ation

pl~s

or

either

between the

between

plan grants

federal and

state

adminis tered

by

the Planning Commission and the tax sharing and grants- in-aid program
adminis tered by the Finance Commiss ion. 61

Ftmds adminis tered by the lat-

ter are largely allocate d on a per capita basis rather than on the basis
of the level of state per capita income.

Although the redistri butive

characte r of plan grants is potentia lly greate4 they have not favored
backward states.

A recent study of all transfer s includin g plan grants and

fiscal transfer s shows that they are at best neutral in their redistri butive
impact. 62

This assessm ent must, however , be modified to reflect conside rable

intersta te inequity in the mobiliz ation of funds in India.

Thomas Eapen's

studies have shown that the large degree of tax authori ty given to state
governm ents has allowed conside rable regiona l dispari ty in tax effort with
many of the wealthi er states exercisi ng very little tax effort.

Again this

is in sharp contras t to China where the unified tax system minimiz es variatio ns
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in tax burden among provinces.
In view of the institutional arrangements it is not surprising that
the pattern of growth in India has been one of regional divergence.

Data

from the 1950s and 1960s show interstate disparities in level of develop
ment have been increasing.

A recent study suggests that these growing dis

parities have resulted in substantial interregional variation in the per
capita availability of calories, proteins, and other important nutrients.
V.

64

Assessment
In 1949 the Chinese Communists inherited an economy whose regional

structure, particularly in industry, was quite imbalanced by international
standards.

The gap in per capita output, primarily between the developed

Northeast and eastern coastal municipalities and the rest of the country,
appears to have been substantially greater than the North-South income gap
in Italy and Yugoslavia, as well as most other less developed conntries.
However, since 1950 Chinese economic policy instruments have been systema
tically structured to achieve a high degree of central control of resource
allocation.

A leadership that appears to have placed a considerable value

on regional integration of the entire economy has, in tum, used these
policy instruments to transfer resources to less developed regions to assure
their comparatively rapid economic growth.
The most important of these policy instruments have been the system
of revenue sharing, the unified tax and fiscal system, and the requirement
that enterprises deposit virtually all of their profits in the state budget.
These instruments have given the central government the ability to systemat
ically determine both the intersectoral and interregional flows of resources
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throughout the economy.

By extending the scope of the unified state bud

get to the lowest level of government administration, the center gained
the ability to redistribute resources for financing local social programs
as well as for investment purposes.

Most significantly, however, unlike

other countries where limited redistributive programs have been grafted
onto institutional arrangements which encourage basically diverging growth
. paths, in China interregional redistribution has been an inherent funda
mental dimension of the planning process from 1950 to the present.
Although there has been considerable decentralization of economic
management authority to lower levels of government since the period of the
First Five Year Plan, the basic institutional roe.chanisms through which the
center controls investment decisions as well as decisions which influence
the size distribution of income have remained intact.

There is, however,

continuing dispute among Western economists concerning the willingness of
the leadership to sacrifice economic growth in pursuit of improvements in
social welfare.

For example, the policy of local self sufficiency, which

has been repeatedly asserted by the Chinese as a central tenet of develop
ment policy, is invariably interpreted in the West as an endorsement of·
growing regional disparity in the quest for more rapid growth.

However,

I would argue that the operative primacy of distributional goals is reflected
in the relative stability of real wages in the industrial sector, the slow
but continuous improvement in the terms of trade between agriculture and
industry, as well as the gradual convergence of regional per capita output.
In spite of the success of the Chinese in reducing interregional
inequality, both the absence of adequate redistributive mechanisms in most
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other less developed countries and the comparative ly high cost of the Chinese
strategy suggest that it may not provide a model for other countries that are
concerned about trends in the size distribution of income.

Although a sub

stantial portion of total investment resources in other countries is some
times state controlled, the geographic mobility of these funds is frequently
sharply curtailed either by decentralize d decision making which places re
source allocation decisions at subnational levels of government or by a
central government investment policy that favors maximal aggregate growth
rather than regional balance.

The absence of adequate redistributi ve mechan

isms in most other LDCs is symptomatic of the lack of an underlying political
consensus in support of redistributi ve objectives.

Although many aspects

of Chinese development policy since 1949 have evolved in a quite cyclical
fashion, there appears to have been a rather sustained commitment to re
distributiv e goals.
Even if adequate redistributi ve mechanisms were available, the rela
tively high cost of the Chinese pattern of regional development would discourage many LDCs from pursuing the Chinese model.

Although a precise assess-

ment cannot be made with available data, the cost of rapid development of
backward areas, in tenns of national growth foregone, appears to have been
quite high.

Incremental capital output ratios in backward regions appear

to have been substantial ly higher than in advanced regions.

Achievement of

rapid growth in less developed regions would appear to be justified primarily
in terms of social welfare and national economic integration .

Many other

LDCs are likely to prefer other more direct and less costly means of im
proving social welfare.
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Appendix Table 1
Industrial Output by Province, 1952, 1957, 1971
(Millions of Yuan)
(1952 Constant Prices)
1952
34,330

1957
78,390

1971
294,420

4,761
1,090
1,889

11,751
2,400
3,930

37,528
8,800

North
Hopeh
·Shantung
Honan
Shansi
Inner Mongolia
Peking
Tientsin

1,342
2,091
478
643
178
715
1,850

2,805
4,068
1,737
1,832
703
2,307
4,300

East
Kiangsu
Anhui
Chekiang
Shanghai

2,584
631
1,099
6,523

4,553
1,501
2,274
12,969

956
767
575

2,8J3
1,788
1,249

<+,uoo

1,745
343
414

3,812
798
1,224

14,138
3,334d
3,030

1,647
269
444

4,873
605
1,078

13,620

5L,5

1,263
567
108
446

HATIONAL
Northeast
--Liaoning
Kirin
Heilungkiang

Central
Hupeh
Hunan
Kiangsi
South
Kwangtung
Kwangsi
Fukien
Southwest
Szechuan
Kweichow
Yunnan
Northwest
Shensi
Kansu
Tsinghai
Sinkiang

137
36
175

16,005
9,851
7,828
17,577
15,750
20,765

48,386

/.

l'"'\r"'I .......

2,595
8,254c
1,725
689
1,383
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Appendi x Table l (Continu ed)
Source: Robert Michael Field, Nicholas R. Lardy, and John Philip Emerson ,
A Reconst ruction of the Gross Value of Industr ial Output by Province in the
People's Republic of China: 1949-1973, Foreign Economi c Report No. 7 (Washin gton,
D.C.: Departm ent of Connnerce~ 1975), p. 9 except 1971 data for Hupeh, Hunan,
Shensi, and Kwangsi .
a. Roland Berger, "Financ ial Aspects of Chinese Plannin g," Bulletin of Concerned,
Asian Scholar s, 6, no. 2, p. 16, reports that 1970 industr ial output was 7,500
million yuan. I assumed that this was in 1957 prices and converte d it to 1952 prices
using an index based on data in State Statisti cal Bureau Ten Great Years (Peking:
Foreign Languag es Press, 1960), p. 14. The value of output in 1971 was calculat ed
,
from the rate of industr ial growth in 1971 as given in Field, Lardy, and Emerson
p. 11.
b. 1974 output was reported to be equal to 29 times that of 1949 (Foreign
Broadca st Informa tion Service (FBIS), Daily Report PRC, Feb. 3, 1975, p. H3;.
The absolute value of output in 1971 was calculat ed from data on output in
1949 and the rate of growth of output during 1971-197 3 as given in Field,
Lardy, and Emerson , pp. 9 and 11, and the assumpti on that the rate of growth
in 1974 was equal to the nationa l rate of 5 percent estimate d by Robert
Michael Field, "Civilia n Industr ial Producti on in the People's Republic of
China: 1949-19 74," in China: A Reassess ment of the Economy, p. 170.
c. 1970 output was reported to be 24 11 times that of 1949 in Ross TerriL.y
"The 800,000 ,000: Report from China, The Atlantic Monthly , November, 1971"
p. 110. (Citatio n provided by T. Rawski). The absolute value of output in
1971 was calculat ~d from data on output in 1949 and the rate of growth of
outout in 1971 as given in Field. Lardy, and Emerson , p. 9 and p. 11.
d. 1974 output was reported to be equal to 21.5 times that of 1950 and 3.48
times that of 1965. (BBC, Summary of World Broadca sts, FE/W845 /A/2). The
absolute value of output in 1971 was calculat ed from data on output in 1950
and the rate of growth of output during 1965-197 1 as given in Field, Lardy,
and Emerson , pp. 21 and 11.
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Appendix Table 2
Gross Value of Agricultural Output b¥ Province, 1957
Millions of Yuan
Northeast
Li2oning 2
Kirin 3
Heilungkiang 4

1,817
1,240
2,300

North
Hopeh 5
Shantung 6
Honan 7
Shansi8
Inner Mongolia9
Pekirag lO

4,450
4,125
4,299
1,455 1
1,2251
80

Tientsin 11
East
Kiangsu 12
Anhui 13
Chekiang 14
Shanghai 15
Central
Hupeh 16
Hu.--ian 1 7
Kiangsi 18
South
Kwangtung 19
Kwangsi 20
Fukien 21
Southwest
Szechuan 22
Kweichow 23
Yunnan 24
Northwest
Shensi 25
Kansu 26
Tsinghai 27
Sinkiang 28
Notes:
noted.

1.

0

3,716
3,028 1
2,424
76
3,500 1
3,481
1,937
3,620
1,754
1,160
6,040
1,608
1,842
2,282
1,423
372 1
901

All values in constant 1952 prices except as

1957 prices
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Appendix - Table 2
Sources:
2
Liaoning shih-nien (Ten Years of Liaoning), Shenyang:
Publishing House, 1960).
3
Kirin Daily,

Liaoning People's

18 March 1959

4
HeilungkiangDaily, 19 September 1958
5
6

Hopei Daily, 10 January 1958
Tsingtao Daily, 5 October 1959

7Honan Daily,
1 January 1959
8

Shansi Daily. 10 October 1959

9

Inner MongQlia Statistical Bureau, Statistics on the economic and cultural
achievements of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, p. 39.
10

Peking Daily, 9 August 1956 gives the value of agricultural output in 1955
as 73.6 million yuan. I assumed that the total growth between 1955 and 1957
was ten percent.
11

Since the geographic area of Tientsin was only about two percent of Peking
prior to 1958, I assume that the value of agricultural output produced within
the city was negligible.
12
13

14
15
16

Hsin-hua Daily,
Anhui Daily,

12 February 1959

Chekiang Workers Daily.

1iberation Daily,

New Hunan Daily,

18
Kiangsi Daily,

20
21
22
23
24

3 January 1958

30 August 1957,

20 January 1958

Yangtse River Daily, 11 March 1958

17

19

10 January 1958

4 May 1958
3 July 1958

New China Semi-Monthly, No. 5, 1958
Kwangsi Daily,

5 October 1955,

Fukien Daily,

30 September 1959

Impartial Daily, 21 August 1957
Kweichow Daily,

8 April 1960

Yunnan Daily, 3 January 1958

27 January 1960
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Appendix Table 3
State Per Capita Income in India, 1960/61-1967/68
(in 1960-61 prices [RS])
1960/61

State

1967 /68
population
income
share(%)

income

population
share(%)

Andhra Pradesh

289 .1

8.4

337.4

8.2

Assam

328.4

2.8

819. 2

3.1

Bihar

222

10.1

231. 7

10.8

Gujarat

402.8

4.8

483.5

4.7

Kerala

326.2

4.0

335.3

4.0

Madhya Pradesh

293.4

7.6

305.9

7.6

Maharashtra

479.4

9.2

474.5

9.4

Mysore

313. 2

5.5

372 .4

5.5

Orissa
Punjab a

267 .9

4.1

294.8

4.1

441.3

4.7

620.1

4.6

Rajas than

272.0

4.7

313.9

4.9

Tamil Nader

343.8

7.8

390.8

7.6

Ultar Pradesh

291. 7

17.3

290.7

17.1

West Bengal

461.9

8.2

450.2

8.3

Coefficient of
Variation

Notes:
Source:

a

.23

.26

Includes Haryana

All data from "The Course of State Incomes: 1960-1968," Quarterly
Economic Report XV, no. 4 (April 1969), p. 22. Coefficient of
variation calculated by author.
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